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THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS? MONTANA V.




In Montana v. Egelhoff the United States Supreme Court up-
held a Montana statute that prohibits a jury from considering evi-
dence of a criminal defendant's intoxicated state when determining
whether he acted with the requisite mens rea.2 The decision is signifi-
cant inasmuch as it marks the first time that the Court has upheld an
evidentiary rule which excludes probative, reliable defense evidence
for the singular purpose of improving a state's conviction rate.
3
Twenty-eight years ago, the Supreme Court established the con-
stitutional requirement that, to attain a conviction, a state must prove
every element of its charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.4 To-
day, however, this seemingly tough procedural safeguard is, for all in-
tents and purposes, a hollow guarantee. As Professor Joshua Dressler
observed in a recent interview, the Court is now allowing states "'in-
credible freedom' to get around [Winship's] mandate by allowing
states to redefine elements in certain contexts, such as intoxica-
tion . . . '[E]ach time they knock a little [more off] Winship."
5
Following a brief historical background and a summary of the
Court's opinion, Section A of the Analysis section of this Comment
will address the Egelhoff plurality's application of relevant case law.
One particular line of constitutional jurisprudence establishes that
limitations placed on a criminal defendant's ability to present a de-
fense can amount to a due process violation.6 Yet, upon reading the
plurality's conservative interpretation of this important line of prece-
* 1998 J. D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to specially thank
Professor Margaret G. Stewart for all of her help.
1. 518 U.S. 37, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
2. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024.
3. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2.a-b. for an analysis of why improving Montana's con-
viction rate is the only tenable purpose for the statute.
4. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
5. Stephanie Stone, U.S. Supreme Court Approves Montana's Bar on Using Voluntary In-
toxication Evidence to Negate Mens Rea, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, June 21, 1996, at 5955, available
in 1996 WL 339404 (third alteration in original).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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dent, one might believe that no substantive right to defend ever
existed.
As a general rule, a state's evidentiary exclusion does not violate
due process unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.' 7 According to the Egelhoff plurality, however, a defendant's
right to introduce evidence of intoxication as it pertains to his mental
state is not fundamental. 8 Consequently, a state need only suggest a
"valid justification" for excluding such evidence from jury
consideration. 9
Section B of the Analysis will assert that the Court's reliance on
historical practice is unwarranted and does not adequately protect a
defendant's interest in introducing exculpatory evidence. While his-
torical pedigree should factor into the constitutional evaluation of a
procedural rule, at least equal consideration must be given to modern
concepts of fundamental fairness. A state's denial of a defendant's
right to present relevant evidence at trial should be subject to a higher
level of scrutiny than the "valid justification" test implemented by the
Egelhoff plurality. Using this test, the Court seems willing to accept as
"valid" a state's interest in improving its conviction rate by lowering
the prosecution's burden.
A defendant's right to a fair trial is implicated, in particular, when
the evidence in question is probative of the defendant's mental state.
A defendant has a compelling interest to present such evidence be-
cause of the way in which the prosecution will attempt to prove its
criminal charges. Generally, the only evidence submitted by the pros-
ecution on the issue of mens rea will be circumstantial. 10 If the de-
fendant is precluded from introducing exculpatory evidence to explain
his mental state at the time of the offense, the level of culpability re-
quired for conviction will effectively be lowered from a subjective to
an objective, "reasonable person" standard. This is fundamentally un-
fair because a defendant's intoxicated state may be his only explana-
tion for why he acted in an unreasonable manner.
A final problem addressed in Section B of the Analysis is that the
Court's conservative test does not compel states to look into less dras-
7. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 523 (1958)).
8. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996).
9. Id. at 2022.
10. In fact, if the defendant has not confessed to the crime, the only way the prosecution




tic means for accomplishing their goals, means which would both
serve the states' professed interests and maintain a defendant's right
to introduce reliable, probative evidence. In the context of voluntary
intoxication, a blanket exclusionary rule effectively removes the ques-
tion of reliability from the trial court's discretion and is thereby over-
inclusive, precluding jury consideration of reliable as well as unrelia-
ble evidence.
Finally, Section C of the Analysis will address Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion in which she asserted that Montana's statute was
not an evidentiary prescription at all-it was simply a redefinition of
the crime of murder.11 The eight other members of the Court dis-
agreed with this interpretation inasmuch as it was not shared by the
Montana Supreme Court. 12 Regardless of which interpretation is cor-
rect, one thing is clear: the Court will grant substantial deference to
state legislatures when it comes to defining criminal offenses. This
section of the Analysis will assess the functional structure of Gins-
burg's "redefined statute" and will investigate the only real limit to
states' authority in this area: the Eighth Amendment proportionality
doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Two lines of jurisprudence are relevant to the constitutional is-
sues addressed in Montana v. Egelhoff. The first series of cases stands
for the proposition that, in order to attain a criminal conviction, a
state must prove every ingredient of the statutorily defined offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.1 3 This constitutional guarantee is
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
The second line of cases establishes that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to present a defense. This right is secured under
both the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment 15 and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16
11. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
12. See, e.g., id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("We are, of course, bound to accept the
interpretation of [state] law by the highest court of the State." (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch.
Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) (alteration in original))).
13. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
14. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See also, e.g., Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967).
16. See supra note 14; see also, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285 (1973).
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A. In re Winship and Progeny: Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
of Every Ingredient of the Offense
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution provide that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. 17 In 1970, in In re Winship,'18 the
Supreme Court held that criminal due process requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every element of the prosecution's case. 19
The analysis in Winship centered on the adjudicatory stage of
New York's juvenile court process. Specifically, § 744(b) of the New
York Family Court Act provided that a determination of guilt in the
juvenile adjudicatory process was based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard.20 Three years earlier, in In re Gault,21 the Court
had determined that, although this type of hearing need not conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, it still required "the
essentials of due process and fair treatment. ' 22
Accordingly, the question confronted by the Court in Winship
was whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt was one of the "essen-
tial" components of due process.23 In a decision authored by Justice
Brennan, the Court answered this question in the affirmative. 24 The
majority reasoned that "[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution
has at stake interests of immense importance," both because he is at
risk of losing his liberty and also because of the stigma associated with
a criminal conviction. 25 Moreover, the Court noted that the commu-
nity's confidence in the criminal law would be undermined "by a stan-
dard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. '26 Justice Harlan worded his concurrence in a
purely utilitarian manner.27 He stressed that the reasonable doubt
standard was essential because the "social disutility" associated with
17. "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19. See id. at 364.
20. See id. at 360. A determination of guilt could result in commitment to a state juvenile
institution until the minor's eighteenth birthday. Id.
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. See id. at 30.
23. 397 U.S. at 359.
24. See id. at 364.
25. Id. at 363.
26. Id. at 364.
27. See id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the conviction of an innocent person is far greater than the disutility
of acquitting a guilty person.
28
Winship therefore established the constitutional requirement
that, in order to convict a defendant, a state must prove every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.29 Initially, Winship was viewed by the states as a
somewhat innocuous decision because it appeared to constitutionalize
a procedural rule already accepted in virtually every state jurisdic-
tion.30 In Mullaney v. Wilbur,31 however, the Court's literal applica-
tion of the Winship doctrine had a far more intrusive effect.
The defendant in Mullaney was charged with murder.32 He ad-
mitted to the killing but claimed that he did it in the heat of passion
and, therefore, was guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. 33 The
trial court had instructed the jury, consistent with Maine's homicide
statute, that the prosecution carried the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful and intentional.34
Once the prosecution met its burden, the burden then shifted to the
defendant to prove "by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. ' 35 If the defen-
dant met this burden, he was guilty only of manslaughter; if the defen-
dant did not meet this burden, he was guilty of murder. The jury
subsequently had convicted him of murder.36
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals reversing the conviction, asserting that
the jury instruction violated the Winship doctrine.37 The gravamen of
the Court's holding was that the absence of provocation was an ele-
ment of the crime of murder. Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant committed murder required that the prosecu-
28. See id.
29. See id. at 364. Justice Brennan used broad, flexible language in defining the new consti-
tutional standard: "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reason-
able-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged." Id.
30. Winship was largely viewed as confirming the existing state of affairs-a state of affairs
in which every jurisdiction employed the reasonable doubt standard in criminal adjudications
.... " Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 31 (1977).
31. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
32. See id. at 685.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 686.
36. See id. at 687.
37. See id. at 690.
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tion prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime, including the
absence of provocation, beyond a reasonable doubt.38 Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, stressed the substantial differences in both pun-
ishment and stigma between murder and manslaughter convictions:
"Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential difference in restric-
tions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction
established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of
greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for
many lesser crimes. '39 Justice Powell asserted that to hold differently
would allow states to circumvent the Winship doctrine at will.40 That
is, a state could simply redefine the elements of its various criminal
offenses and then define a long list of mitigating factors.
41
Mullaney was perceived as a far-reaching decision which ap-
peared to sound the death-knell for many traditional affirmative de-
fenses. 42 Only two years later in Patterson v. New York, 43 however,
the Court made it clear that this was not the case.
New York defined second-degree murder as consisting of two ele-
ments: (1) "intent to cause the death of another" human being, and
(2) causing such death or the death of a third person.44 The statute
allowed a defendant to raise the affirmative defense of "extreme emo-
tional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse."' 45 The court instructed the jury that the state carried the bur-
den of proving the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt,
but the defendant carried the burden of proving extreme emotional
disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence. 46 On appeal, the de-
fendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional, based on Mulla-
ney, due to the shift of the burden of proof regarding extreme
emotional disturbance.47
Nevertheless, the Court, in a five to three opinion written by Jus-
tice White, refused to strike down the statute and affirmed the defen-
dant's conviction. The Court held that a state's use of a procedural
38. See id. at 704.
39. Id. at 698.
40. See id.
41. For example, a state could redefine murder as the killing of another human being, ab-
sent a mens rea element. The burden would then shift to the defendant to prove the absence of
an intent to kill by a preponderance of evidence.
42. See Allen, supra note 30, at 32-33.
43. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
44. Id. at 198.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 200.
47. See id. at 201.
[Vol. 73:425
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rule does not violate due process unless "it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental. 48 Thus, the Court simply ignored much of
the reasoning of Mullaney (i.e., that the prosecution must prove every
fact necessary to convict, including the absence of the defendant's as-
serted affirmative defenses) and, instead, focused on the potential
problems associated with restricting legislative decisions. 49 Specifi-
cally, the Court noted the irony of forcing a state, under the guise of
the Due Process Clause, to choose between abandoning its affirmative
defenses altogether or disproving their existence beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 0 In response to the concerns voiced in Mullaney, that states
might reallocate burdens of proof by redefining their offenses, the
Court simply noted that "there are obviously constitutional limits be-
yond which the States may not go in that regard. ' 51
Rather than expressly overrule Mullaney, the Court distinguished
Patterson based on the differences between the Maine (Mullaney) and
New York (Patterson) murder statutes.5 2 Included in Maine's defini-
tion of malice aforethought was the requirement that the killing be
unprovoked.53 Therefore, placing the burden on the defendant to
prove provocation by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitu-
tionally shifted the burden of proof on an element of the crime of
murder. By contrast, the New York statute in Patterson defined mur-
der without any reference to provocation, so that proof of extreme
emotional disturbance did not serve to negate an element of the crime
itself.54
Consequently, the rule following Patterson was that a state must
prove every ingredient of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and
that presuming the existence of that ingredient upon proof of the
other elements of the offense violates due process.55 The Patterson
reasoning is also consistent with Leland v. Oregon,56 decided twenty-
48. Id. at 201-02 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
49. See id. at 207-08.
50. See id. See also Allen, supra note 30, at 42 ("If the constitutional interest in the reason-
able doubt standard centers on liberty deprivation, how can the addition of a chance to mitigate
a constitutional punishment invalidate the statute?").
51. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. Exactly what these constitutional limitations are, however,
remains anything but "obvious." One potential limit to states' authority in defining criminal
offenses is the Eighth Amendment. See infra notes 301-313 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Eighth Amendment Proportionality Doctrine.
52. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214-15.
53. See id. at 213.
54. See id. at 206-07.
55. See id. at 215.
56. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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five years earlier, where the Court held that placing the burden of
proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant is con-
stitutional. In other words, proof of insanity does not serve to negate
any of the elements of the offense itself; it merely operates as an ex-
cuse. Accordingly, the Patterson Court found a logically consistent
method for distinguishing Mullaney.57 It now appears, however, that
Mullaney has been effectively overruled by Martin v. Ohio.58
In Martin, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an Ohio
statute which placed the burden of proving self-defense on the de-
fendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 59 The defendant argued
that one of the elements of self-defense, an honest belief of imminent
danger, negated the ingredient of "prior calculation and design" re-
quired for a conviction of aggravated murder.60 In a five to four opin-
ion, the Court upheld the statute, once again emphasizing the
"4'preeminent role of the States in preventing and dealing with
crime."'61 The Court acknowledged the defendant's assertion "that
the elements of aggravated murder and self-defense overlap in the
sense that evidence to prove the latter will often tend to negate the
former. '62 Nevertheless, the majority focused on the fact that the jury
considered self-defense evidence in determining whether the state had
proved the elements of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable
doubt.63 The Court further noted that an instruction which prevented
the jury from considering such evidence would "plainly run afoul of
Winship's mandate." 64
The four dissenters argued that this type of instruction has the
potential to cause serious jury confusion as to the proper burden of
proof.65 For example, a defendant may not introduce sufficient evi-
dence to prove that he had an honest belief of imminent danger to
meet the preponderance standard. Such evidence may be enough,
however, to establish a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted with
the prior calculation and design required for aggravated murder. As
Justice Powell argued in dissent, "[b]ecause [the defendant] had the
burden of proof on this issue, the jury could have believed that it was
57. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
58. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
59. See id. at 230.
60. Id. at 234.
61. Id. at 232.
62. Id. at 234.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 233-34.
65. See id. at 240 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 73:425
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just as likely as not that [the defendant's] conduct was justified, and
yet still have voted to convict.
'66
In sum, the significance of Martin lies in the Court's abandon-
ment of a literal interpretation of the Winship doctrine and a resur-
gent emphasis on historical criminal practice and deference to state
legislative decisions when conducting due process analyses.
B. A Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Present
a Defense
1. Cases which establish the right
The second line of jurisprudence relevant to this Comment con-
sists of cases where statutory limitations placed on a criminal defen-
dant's ability to present a defense were held unconstitutional.
67
Washington v. Texas68 addressed the constitutionality of a statute
which provided that neither principals, accomplices, nor accessories of
a crime could be witnesses for one another.69 In compliance with the
statute, defendant Washington's alleged accomplice, Fuller, was pre-
cluded from testifying at trial on Washington's behalf.70 Washington
was subsequently convicted of murder. Had he been permitted, Fuller
would have testified that Washington tried to convince him to leave
and then ran off before Fuller committed the murder.71
The Court reversed Washington's conviction, holding that the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a fundamental
element of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The
Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment was not originally ap-
plied to state criminal trials and that common law courts originally
precluded coparticipants of the same crime from testifying for one an-
other.73 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a de-
fense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth
lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
66. Id. at 243.
67. This line includes cases where the trial court precluded jury consideration of probative
defense evidence.
68. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
69. See id. at 15.
70. See id. at 16-17.
71. See id. at 16.
72. See id. at 17-18.
73. See id. at 18, 20-21.
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right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right
is a fundamental element of due process of law.
7 4
Several years later, in Chambers v. Mississippi,75 the Court as-
sessed the constitutionality of a trial in which the trial court precluded
the defendant from introducing witnesses on his own behalf due to
Mississippi's hearsay rule and also prevented him from cross-examin-
ing a witness because of Mississippi's "voucher" rule.76 Chambers was
one in a crowd of about fifty persons obstructing the attempts of five
police officers to arrest a criminal suspect. 77 A scuffle ensued and
someone in the crowd fatally shot one of the officers. 78 The wounded
officer shot Chambers in the back as he was fleeing the scene and
Chambers was subsequently arrested and charged with murder.
79
Several months later, McDonald, who was in the crowd at the
time of the murder, gave a sworn confession stating that he shot the
officer.80 Shortly thereafter, however, at a preliminary hearing, he re-
tracted the confession, asserting that he was tricked into making it.
8 1
He also claimed that he was elsewhere with a friend, Turner, at the
time of the murder. 82 At trial, the judge allowed the defendant to call
McDonald to the stand, but precluded him from treating McDonald as
an adverse witness due to a Mississippi common law rule that a party
cannot impeach his own witness. 83 Under the rule, a party who calls a
witness thereby "vouches" for his credibility. The trial court also re-
fused to allow Chambers to introduce testimony of three other wit-
nesses due to Mississippi's common law hearsay rule.84 This refusal
was significant because, shortly after the crime, McDonald had con-
fessed to each one of the witnesses on separate occasions.
85
Nonetheless, Chambers was permitted to introduce some evi-
dence of McDonald's guilt. Despite Mississippi's exclusionary hearsay
rule, Chambers was allowed to present McDonald's sworn confession
to the jury.86 Moreover, the defense counsel was permitted to ex-
74. Id. at 19.
75. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
76. See id. at 294.
77. See id. at 285-86.
78. See id. at 286.
79. See id. at 285-86.
80. See id. at 287.
81. See id. at 288.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 291.
84. See id. at 292.
85. See id. at 292-93.
86. See id. at 291.
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amine McDonald's alibi, Turner, who admitted on the stand that he
was not with McDonald on the night of the murder.8 7
In an eight to one decision, the Court reversed Chambers' convic-
tion, observing that hearsay is generally deemed inadmissible because
"untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of
fact."88 The Court further noted, however, the number of exceptions
to the hearsay rule which had been created over the years in cases
where the reliability of such evidence is otherwise assured. 89 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that each of McDonald's statements was made
''spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder," that
each statement was corroborated by evidence adduced at trial, and
that each statement was a declaration against interest. 90 The Court
asserted that "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascer-
tainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 91
Unlike Washington, in which the right to defend was based on the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, 92 the right to defend
articulated by the Chambers Court rested purely on due process
grounds. 93 Moreover, Chambers was a significant, far-reaching deci-
sion in that it established for the first time that the partial exclusion of
defense evidence, while properly based on common law evidentiary
rules, could amount to a due process violation. 94
More recently, in Crane v. Kentucky,95 the Court once again held
that limitations placed on a defendant's ability to present a defense
may violate due process. The defendant in Crane confessed to the
charge of murder but moved to suppress that confession before trial.96
During a pretrial hearing, the judge determined that the confession
was voluntary and denied the defendant's motion.97 Based on this
pretrial determination, the court further precluded the defendant
from introducing evidence at trial relating to the "physical and psy-
87. See id. at 292.
88. Id. at 298.
89. See id. at 298-99.
90. Id. at 300-01. A declaration against interest is a statement which is unlikely to be
fabricated because at the time it is made it is contrary to the speaker's interest.
91. Id. at 302. See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (excluded hearsay testi-
mony amounted to a due process violation where testimony was relevant in the punishment
phase of the trial and where substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability).
92. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967).
93. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
94. See id.
95. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).




chological environment" in which his confession was made.98 The
judge felt that any such evidence related only to the "voluntariness" of
the confession-an issue which had already been resolved as a matter
of law.99
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the ruling
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.100 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice O'Connor distinguished between evidence bearing on the volun-
tariness of a confession and evidence bearing on its credibility. 101 The
"voluntariness" determination, the Court maintained, is employed to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights.10 2 That is, if a confession
has been extracted using particularly offensive interrogation tech-
niques, it should not be presented to the jury.10 3 Accordingly, the
question of voluntariness is a question of law for the trial judge. 1°4
Even confessions that have been found to be voluntary are not
conclusive of guilt, however, and must be scrutinized by the jury in the
context of the reasonable doubt standard.105 Consequently, the Court
held that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a mean-
ingful opportunity to present a complete defense.""' 06 The trial
judge's decision essentially eviscerated the defendant's right to an op-
portunity to be heard: "that opportunity would be an empty one if the
State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evi-
dence ... when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of
innocence."107 The Court, however, went on to indicate that the ex-
clusion of such evidence might survive constitutional scrutiny given a
"valid state justification." 108 Hence, the constitutional question will
frequently revolve around the Court's willingness to accept as valid a




100. See id. at 687.
101. See id. at 687-88.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 687. This prohibition is both to discourage the use of such techniques and
because the evidence is unreliable and may prejudice the jury.
104. See id. at 688-89.
105. See id. at 689.
106. Id. at 690 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
107. Id.
108. Id. This statement was relied upon by the majority in Egelhoff to distinguish Egelhoff
from previous "right to defend" cases.
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2. Cases which limit the right
It is clear that a defendant does not have an unencumbered right
to introduce all relevant evidence to the jury. For example, in Taylor
v. Illinois,109 the Court concluded that the use of sanctions in response
to a defendant's willful violation of a discovery rule did not offend the
Constitution. 10 Taylor was on trial for attempted murder for a shoot-
ing that took place during a violent encounter in which Taylor and
several of his friends used clubs to beat Bridges, the victim."' At
trial, the prosecution called witnesses who testified that Taylor shot
Bridges in the back and then attempted unsuccessfully to shoot him in
the head. 112 Witnesses for Taylor, however, testified that the gun was
actually fired by Bridges' brother, who shot into the group and hit
Bridges accidentally.113
The prosecution filed a pretrial discovery motion, as required by
an Illinois statute, requesting a list of all defense witnesses. 114 On the
second day of trial, however, the defense moved to amend the list to
include two additional witnesses." 5 The trial judge found the defense
guilty of a discovery violation and, as a sanction, precluded the testi-
mony of one of the two additional witnesses." 6 Taylor was subse-
quently convicted of attempted murder."17
In a five to three decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Court
affirmed the conviction-." 8 The majority held that the right to present
material defense witnesses is grounded in the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but that right is not absolute.119 For
example, "[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer tes-
timony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible
under standard rules of evidence.' 120
The Court focused on two valid state justifications for the imposi-
tion of sanctions. First, the state has an interest in the orderly conduct
of a criminal trial.121 This interest would be compromised if a state
109. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
110. See id. at 402.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 402-03.
114. See id. at 403.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 405.
117. See id. at 402.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 409.
120. Id. at 410.
121. See id. at 410-11.
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was constitutionally prohibited from imposing sanctions for discovery
violations. 122 Second, the state has a valid interest in precluding the
admission of unreliable testimony. 123 Consequently, while less severe
sanctions may sometimes be appropriate, 124 the Constitution does not
compel a state to allow all relevant testimony when a criminal defen-
dant fails to comply with procedural requirements. 125
3. Statutory limitations
The exclusion of relevant evidence is also explicitly provided for
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 26 Federal Rule of Evidence 403
provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.' 27 Evidence causing undue prejudice is evidence which
may suggest a decision on an improper basis, "commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.' 28 Thus, gruesome photographs of a
defendant's alleged murder victim are generally excluded from jury
consideration because of the fear that they may trigger an irrational,
emotional response. Generally speaking, however, Rule 403 is consid-
ered an extraordinary measure which should be used infrequently.
29
As the rule itself explicitly states, the danger of unfair prejudice must
122. See id. As Justice Stevens averred, "[tihe adversary process could not function effec-
tively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and
arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to
contradict or explain the opponent's case." Id.
123. See id. at 411-12 ("Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment
will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony.").
124. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("While it can scarcely be doubted
that claims of unfair surprise may still be justified despite procedural requirements of notice and
instrumentalities of discovery, the granting of a continuance is a more appropriate remedy than
exclusion of the evidence.").
125. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-15. See also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 (1991)
(failure to comply with notice-and-hearing requirement of Michigan's rape-shield statute under-
mined legitimate state interest in protecting rape victims; resulting exclusion of witness testi-
mony did not rise to the level of constitutional violation); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
227 (1975) (district court's preclusion of witness testimony was appropriate method of assuring
compliance with its order).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
127. Id.
128. FED. R. EVID. 403 (advisory committee's note).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 79 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Because Rule 403
requires the exclusion of relevant evidence, it is an extraordinary measure that should be used
sparingly."); Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[Rule




substantially outweigh the probative value of such evidence. 130 Evi-
dence which is tagged as "highly probative" is invariably deemed ad-
missible notwithstanding its prejudicial effect. 31 For example, graphic
autopsy photographs may be admitted if they evince a sufficient pro-
bative value.132 According to the advisory committee's note to Rule
403, "[t]he availability of other means of proof may also be an appro-
priate factor" to consider. 33
Rape-shield laws, now enacted in virtually every state jurisdic-
tion, serve a purpose similar to Rule 403.134 Such laws preclude the
admission of evidence of the victim's prior sexual activities in cases of
rape and sexual assault. 135 The limited probative value of such evi-
dence, when compared with the potential for jury prejudice and po-
tential emotional harm to the victim, warrants its exclusion in most
cases. 13
6
Finally, hearsay statements, though relevant, are inadmissible un-
less they fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 137 Hear-
say is an out of court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."'1 38 Such statements are excluded from the
jury based on reliability concerns. For example, out-of-court state-
ments may easily be taken out of context. Moreover, the declarant is
not under oath and his demeanor cannot be scrutinized by the jury.
Most importantly, hearsay statements are not amenable to cross ex-
amination, a procedural vehicle considered crucial to the truth-finding
process.139
In any case, the assertion that hearsay statements are inadmissi-
ble is misleading considering the number of hearsay exceptions that
130. FED. R. EVID. 403.
131. See United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1467 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
784 (1996) (evidence of defendant's past violence against victim was highly probative of victim's
failure to report molestation for significant period of time); United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138,
142 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding evidence of defendant's past abuse of son may well have been
prejudicial but was nonetheless admissible because of highly probative nature of evidence).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Yahweh, 792 F. Supp 104, 108 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (lifesize en-
larged photographs of the murder victims were necessary to show the relevant details of how the
victims were killed).
133. FED. R. EVlD. 403 (advisory committee's note).
134. See, e.g., People v. Wilhelm, 476 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
135. See also FED. R. EvID. 412.
136. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's notes. The Federal Rules of Evidence were
amended in 1994 to preclude the admission of evidence of victims' past sexual behavior.
137. FED. R. EVID. 802.
138. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
139. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) ("The right to cross-examination, pro-
tected by the Confrontation Clause... is... designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding
functions of a criminal trial.").
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have developed over the years. 140 An in-depth discussion of hearsay
exceptions is beyond the scope of this Comment. A feature common
to statements falling into one of the exception categories, however, is
that there is some reason to otherwise assume the statement's
reliability.14
1
In sum, while all jurisdictions exclude relevant defense evidence
from jury consideration, such exclusions are invariably based on relia-
bility concerns or concerns that such evidence may mislead the jury
and result in a judgment on an improper basis.
III. THE DECISION: MONTANA v. EGELHOFF
A. Facts and Procedural History
In July 1992, James Allen Egelhoff traveled to the Yaak region of
Montana to pick mushrooms and camp out.142 While there, he be-
friended Roberta Pavola and John Christenson, who were camping in
the same area.143 On July 12, 1992, Pavola, Christenson, and Egelhoff
sold their mushrooms together, then went on a drinking binge for the
rest of the day.144 Later in the evening, they bought more alcohol and
attended a party. 145 The three left the party sometime after 9:00 p.m.
in Christenson's station wagon. 146
It is not clear what took place over the remainder of the evening.
One witness testified that Egelhoff and Christenson bought more al-
cohol from a grocery store at 9:20 p.m., and numerous witnesses testi-
fied to observing the station wagon swerving around the road later in
the evening. 147 Law enforcement officers confirmed five areas where
the car had veered off the road before it finally came to a complete
stop.
14 8
Officers arrived to find the station wagon in a ditch, with Chris-
tenson and Pavola dead in the front seat and Egelhoff in the rear yell-
ing obscenities.149 Each of the victims had been shot once in the
140. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 346.
(1961) ("In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small and lonely
island.").
141. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 565-66 (3d ed. 1991).
142. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2016 (1996).
143. See id. In State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996),
Christenson's name is spelled Christianson.
144. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 262.
148. See id.
149. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.
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head. 150 The officers found Egelhoff's .38 caliber handgun in the front
of the vehicle near the brake pedal.151 They took Egelhoff to the hos-
pital, where he became combative and had to be physically re-
strained.'5 2 At that time, his blood alcohol content measured
approximately .36%. 153 One officer testified that Egelhoff's wild be-
havior continued, on and off, for the five to six hours the officer was at
the hospital.' 54 When Egelhoff sobered up, he claimed that he had no
recollection of the events which took place that evening.' 55 His last
memory was of attending the party and he remembered that the sun
had not gone down during that time.
156
Forensic testing identified gun powder residue on Egelhoff's
hands.' 57 The bullet which killed Pavola was never recovered. 158 The
state's firearms examiner testified, however, that the bullet which
killed Christenson "could have come from thousands of guns with
characteristics" similar to Egelhoff's.
159
Egelhoff argued at trial that, due to his highly intoxicated state,
he was incapable of driving the station wagon or performing any of
the physical tasks which the prosecution claimed he performed.' 60 On
the way to the hospital that evening, he continually asked ambulance
personnel questions, such as "Did you find him?"'' Although he did
not remember specifically, Egelhoff theorized that there was a fourth
party who became part of the group later in the evening who had com-
mitted the murders.' 62 He argued that his lack of recollection of the
evening's events was the result of an alcoholic "blackout.' 1 63 A doc-
tor who examined Egelhoff in the emergency room testified that,
based on Egelhoff s blood alcohol level and behavior, this was proba-
bly the case. 164
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 262.
153. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.






160. See id. at 262-63. A prosecution witness testified that Egelhoff had to be physically
restrained at the hospital and intentionally and accurately kicked a camera out of a detective's
hands when the detective was preparing to take Egelhoff's photograph. See id. at 262.
161. Id. at 263.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 262-63.
164. See id. at 263.
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At trial, the jury was instructed that in order to convict Egelhoff
of deliberate homicide they had to find that he caused the death of
Pavola or Christenson purposely or knowingly. 165 Montana defines
"purposely" and "knowingly" as they are commonly defined, based on
a subjective level of culpability.166 The jury was further instructed
that evidence of Egelhoff's intoxicated condition could not be consid-
ered when determining whether he acted purposely or knowingly. 67
Egelhoff was subsequently convicted of deliberate homicide. a68
He appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that the
foregoing instruction deprived him of due process. 169 The court
agreed and reversed his conviction. 170 The court noted that the prose-
cution was permitted to introduce a substantial amount of evidence
which tended to prove that Egelhoff had acted with the requisite cul-
pability. 171 Egelhoff, however, was not permitted to rebut this evi-
165. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2016 (1996). The instruction was given in
accordance with Montana's deliberate homicide statute which provided, in pertinent part: "A
person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if: (a) he purposely or knowingly causes the
death of another human being .... Mo r. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1)(a) (1995).
166. "Knowingly"-a person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circum-
stance described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware of the per-
son's own conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with
respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when the
person is aware that it is highly probable that the result will be caused by the person's
conduct. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an of-
fense, knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its exist-
ence. Equivalent terms, such as "knowing" or "with knowledge", have the same
meaning.
MONT. CODE AN . § 45-2-101(34) (1997).
"Purposely"-a person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described
by a statute defining an offense if it is the person's conscious object to engage in that
conduct or to cause that result. When a particular purpose is an element of an offense,
the element is established although the purpose is conditional, unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
Equivalent terms, such as "purpose" and "with the purpose", have the same meaning.
Mor. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(63) (1997).
167. The jury instruction-the focus of the constitutional issue addressed in this Comment-
was read in accordance with the following Montana statute:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct
and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the
offense unless the defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating
substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise ingested the sub-
stance causing the condition.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
168. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.
169. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 261.
170. See id. at 267.
171. The court observed:
That evidence included the following: In order to commit the crimes, he had to take
the gun from the glove compartment of the vehicle. He made an attempt to flee after
he went into the ditch. He tried to avoid detection when Rebecca Garrison tried to
approach the car. Ms. Garrison noticed a stick which she assumed must have been used
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dence with evidence of his intoxication-evidence which the court
deemed relevant to the question of mens rea.172 As such, the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof was lowered in derogation of In re Winship
73
and its progeny, and Egelhoff was unconstitutionally denied "a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."' 174 Moreover,
the court went on to assert that a criminal defendant has a constitu-
tional right to present all relevant evidence at trial.
175
B. The Court's Analysis
In a five to four decision, with the plurality opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme
Court's decision.176 As a preliminary matter, the plurality character-
ized the Montana Supreme Court's ruling, that a criminal defendant
has a constitutional right "to introduce all relevant evidence" at trial,
as "indefensible.' 1 77 The Court cited Taylor v. Illinois178 and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 403 and 802179 as evidence that the Montana
Supreme Court's holding was overly broad.
1. The rule
The Court then began its analysis with the oft-quoted 180 proposi-
tion that a state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in ac-
cordance with its own conception of policy and fairness, unless in so
doing "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 8 1 Ac-
by Egelhoff to depress the accelerator so that Egelhoff could drive from the back seat.
He could talk. At the IGA store at 9:20 p.m., Egelhoff spoke well and did not slur his
words. He later told Ms. Garrison to "stay away" and he talked to the ambulance
driver. He had physical energy and strength. He tried to avoid detection by another of
the witnesses who had stopped to give assistance. Detective Bernall testified that his
coordination was good as was demonstrated by his kicking of the camera. The evidence
was presented by the State to establish that Egelhoff acted "purposely" or "knowingly."
Such evidence could be properly considered by the jury in its determination of whether
or not he acted "purposely" or "knowingly."
Id. at 265.
172. See id.
173. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
174. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 265 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)).
175. See id. at 266.
176. Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2024 (1996). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. Id. at 2015.
177. Id. at 2017.
178. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
179. Both Taylor and these Federal Rules of Evidence are discussed earlier in the historical
background section of this Comment. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
180. Oft-quoted, that is, when the Court is ruling against a criminal defendant.
181. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
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cording to the plurality, the question boiled down to whether the use
of voluntary intoxication evidence for the purpose of assessing a de-
fendant's mental state was a "fundamental principle of justice. ' 182
Moreover, the "primary guide" for determining whether a principle is
fundamental, asserted Scalia, is "historical practice. '"183
2. Historical practice
The Court launched into a summary of the historical treatment of
the intoxicated criminal offender, beginning with the writings of Hale,
Blackstone, and Coke.184 Coke and Blackstone both believed that in-
toxication should be considered an aggravation of an offense, rather
than an excuse. 185 Citing Blackstone and Hale, Justice Story had writ-
ten that he "learned in [his] earlier studies, that so far from its being in
law an excuse for murder, [drunkenness] is rather an aggravation of its
malignity."186
At this point, it is important to note the distinction between the
use of intoxication as an excuse (affirmative defense) and as evidence
of mens rea. As discussed earlier in the Winship line of jurisprudence,
the burden of proving affirmative defenses may be constitutionally
placed on a defendant. 187 Thus, a defendant may act with the requi-
site mens rea for murder but will, nonetheless, be acquitted if he can
prove the elements of self-defense by a preponderance of evidence.
Few jurisdictions have established an affirmative defense of intoxica-
tion and there is little doubt that it is not constitutionally required.188
The preclusion of evidence of intoxication altogether-evidence
which is probative of an element of the offense itself (the defendant's
mens rea)-is a far different matter. On this point, the plurality
deemed it "inconceivable" that Hale, Coke, and Blackstone, who
were quite familiar with the concept of mens rea, believed that evi-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 2018.
185. See id.
186. Id. (quoting United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657-58 (C.C. R.I. 1820) (No.
14,868)). Story's statement, however, has received some criticism. Professor Jerome Hall wrote
that "[sluch a statement by so great a judge reveals the complexity, if not the hopelessness, of the
problem. The fact is that drunkenness was never a crime at common law, and it never served as
an aggravation." Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1045,
1067 n.88 (1944).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) ("preventing and dealing
with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government").
[Vol. 73:425
MONTANA V. EGELHOFF
dence of intoxication should be admissible in determining a defen-
dant's culpability.189
The plurality conceded, however, that the courts carved out an
exception to this evidentiary bar in the nineteenth century and, by the
turn of this century, evidence of intoxication could be considered by
juries in most American jurisdictions. 19° Nonetheless, argued Scalia,
the admissibility of such evidence never attained a "fundamental prin-
ciple" status. 191
3. Policy considerations
The Court then examined several justifications for Montana's ex-
clusionary statute. 192 After noting the substantial relationship be-
tween drinking and crime, the Court observed that the rule promotes
general deterrence by "increasing the punishment for all unlawful acts
committed in that state," and specific deterrence by keeping violent,
inebriate offenders locked up. 193 The final policy concern noted by
the plurality was the fear that jurors will be misled by evidence of
voluntary intoxication.' 94 In other words, jurors will be too quick to
believe "that the defendant was biologically incapable of forming the
requisite mens rea.' 95 The Court concluded that policy reasons were
sufficient to uphold the statute.1 96 In sum, the rule allowing juries to
consider voluntary intoxication evidence was of "too recent vintage"
and had not been supported by a sufficient number of states to be
deemed fundamental.
97
4. Dealing with precedent
Once the historical significance and state justification for the rule
were established, Scalia found it relatively easy to differentiate the
Court's holding from relevant, seemingly adverse case law. Chambers
189. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2018. "Hale's statement that a drunken offender shall have the
same judgment 'as if he were in his right senses' must be understood as precluding a defendant
from arguing that, because of his intoxication, he could not have possessed the mens rea required
to commit the crime." Id. (quoting 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *32-33).
190. See id. at 2019.
191. Id. at 2019-20. Significantly, one-fifth of the states currently have statutes similar in
function to Montana's. Id.
192. See id. at 2020. Such justifications "alone cast[ ] doubt upon the proposition that the
opposite rule is a 'fundamental principle."' Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 2021.
195. Id.




v. Mississippi was effectively limited to its facts. 198 The plurality as-
serted that the Chambers holding was based on the state's use of com-
mon law hearsay and voucher rules which, in combination, eviscerated
the defendant's right to present a defense. The plurality distinguished
Crane v. Kentucky on the grounds that Kentucky lacked a valid justifi-
cation for excluding from jury consideration the circumstances under
which Crane made his confession. 199 By contrast, the plurality had
already labeled Montana's justification for the exclusion of voluntary
intoxication evidence "valid.
'200
According to the plurality, the Winship doctrine was not violated
here because, notwithstanding the instruction on voluntary intoxica-
tion, the jury was advised that the state carried the burden of proving
all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.20 1 The Court
noted the "considerable" amount of evidence brought forward by the
state which tended to prove Egelhoff's guilt. 20 2 While it was true, the
Court conceded, that the rule effectively lowered the prosecution's
burden of proof, this was not unconstitutional unless the evidentiary
rule itself violated a fundamental principle of justice.20 3
5. Ginsburg's concurrence
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the dis-
sent that if the statute had been designed solely for the purpose of
keeping relevant exculpatory evidence from the jury, then it was un-
constitutional. 20 4 As she saw it, however, the statute simply redefined
the mens rea element of deliberate homicide.20 5 States are given sub-
stantial leeway in defining the elements of their criminal offenses.
20 6
A statute which redefines mens rea so that voluntary intoxication is
irrelevant should not be classified as a rule of evidence at all-it is
simply part of the definition of the criminal offense itself.20 7 Accord-
ingly, Montana's statute represents a state decision that a sober de-
198. See id. at 2022.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 2020-21.
201. See id. at 2022-23.
202. Id. at 2023. Such evidence included the fact that Egelhoff asked Pavola to put his gun in
the glove compartment of the station wagon several hours before the murders and that the
murders were accomplished in an "execution-style manner"-one shot to the head of each vic-
tim. Id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205. See id.
206. See id. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
207. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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fendant and an intoxicated defendant should be held equally
accountable for their conduct, regardless of the effect of alcohol on
the defendant's mental state.
208
6. The dissent
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor in
dissent.20 9 O'Connor argued that the plurality gave insufficient weight
to both the Winship doctrine and the "right to defend" line of juris-
prudence. 210 In response to Justice Scalia's assertion that criminal de-
fendants have never enjoyed an unencumbered constitutional right to
introduce all relevant evidence, O'Connor distinguished Scalia's ex-
clusionary examples on the grounds that
none of the "familiar" evidentiary rules operates as Montana's does.
The Montana statute places a blanket exclusion on a category of
evidence that would allow the accused to negate the offense's
mental-state element. In so doing, it frees the prosecution, in the
face of such evidence, from having to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant nevertheless possessed the required
mental state.
211
Moreover, continued O'Connor, the purpose of familiar exclusionary
rules is not to ease "the State's burden, but rather, to vindicate some
other goal or value-e.g., to ensure the reliability and competency of
evidence or to encourage effective communications within certain re-
lationships. '212 In sum, the dissenters maintained that the adversary
process is unconstitutionally distorted by an evidentiary rule which
serves the sole purpose of bolstering the state's conviction rate.
213
IV. ANALYSIS
In upholding the Montana voluntary intoxication statute, the
Court in Egelhoff refused to acknowledge the significance of its deci-
sion. The fact is, Egelhoff marks the first time that the Court has up-
held an evidentiary rule which operates to exclude probative, reliable
defense evidence for the singular purpose of improving a state's con-
viction rate.
208. See id.
209. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 2029.
211. Id. at 2026.
212. Id. at 2029.
213. See id. at 2026.
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A. A Note on the Court's Application of Precedent
1. The state's burden of proof
Under the Winship/Patterson doctrine, the burden is on the state
to prove every element of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.214 The Egelhoff plurality asserted that this constitutional re-
quirement was not implicated because the jury was instructed on the
reasonable doubt standard. 215 Therefore, according to this argument,
if Montana had failed to produce enough evidence to prove Egelhoff's
mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, he would have been acquit-
ted. This argument places form over substance. Obviously, if the de-
fendant is precluded from introducing relevant, exculpatory evidence,
the prosecution's burden is effectively lowered. Juries weigh the evi-
dence on both sides of a case to determine whether they have a rea-
sonable doubt about the prosecution's case. If the only interpretation
of the evidence is that offered by the prosecution, the reasonable
doubt standard is eviscerated.
For example, if the only evidence offered at trial is that X shot Y,
the jury may infer that X acted intentionally. If X is precluded from
introducing exculpatory evidence, the prosecution can simply paint its
own picture of what happened. It is, therefore, an oversimplification
to say that the prosecution's burden is the same regardless of what
evidence the defendant is allowed to introduce. For the reasonable
doubt standard to serve as a meaningful procedural safeguard, it must
be thought of in the context of all relevant, probative evidence.
2. The defendant's constitutional right to defend
The "right to defend" line of jurisprudence was clearly the most
difficult hurdle encountered by the Egelhoff plurality. Yet, upon read-
ing Justice Scalia's analysis, one might believe that no substantive
right to defend ever existed. Scalia simply refused to acknowledge the
importance of Chambers v. Mississippi,2 16 characterizing the case as
"an exercise in highly case-specific error correction. '217 Vhile it is
true that the majority in Chambers maintained that they were estab-
lishing "no new principles of constitutional law, '218 this was clearly
not the case. Chambers did, in fact, create new constitutional law.
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
216. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
217. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022.
218. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03.
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First, as Professor Robert Clinton observed, Chambers was one
of the first right to defend cases which "rested on due process
grounds, rather than on an incorporation of one of the specific guar-
antees of the [F]ifth or [S]ixth [A]mendments. '219 This is apparent
based on much of the analysis in Chambers. For example, Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, noted that "[t]he right of an accused
in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair op-
portunity to defend against the State's accusations. 2 2 0 This "right to
an opportunity to defend" is not explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.2 21 Furthermore, while the Sixth Amendment grants a
defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him,2 22 as Profes-
sor Clinton points out, "McDonald never accused Chambers of any-
thing; his testimony was important only because he had confessed to
the crime himself. 22 3 Thus, Chambers was substantially resolved on
due process grounds.
224
Second, and most important, Chambers established that the par-
tial implementation of traditional common law rules of evidence can
amount to a due process violation.2 25 Although Justice Scalia asserted
that Chambers was a "fact-intensive" case from which it would be dif-
ficult to discern any generalized holding,2 26 he never attempted to ex-
plain why the facts of Chambers' trial were more egregious than the
facts of Egelhoff's. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why the blan-
ket exclusion of evidence of intoxication-evidence which may be the
defendant's only hope of explaining his mental state-is less offensive
to the Constitution than the partial exclusions of hearsay and witness
testimony. The narrow holding which Scalia was able to discern was
"that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the
level of a due process violation.
'227
219. Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guaran-
tee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 791 (1976).
220. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294.
221. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Clinton, supra note 219, at 788.
222. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
223. Clinton, supra note 219, at 788.
224: Alternatively, the holding in Chambers can be seen as emanating from a penumbra
created by the Sixth and Fifth Amendments. In any case, the decision cannot stand on a literal
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.
225. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. The exclusion was only "partial" because Chambers was
permitted to introduce McDonald's signed confession to the jury. Moreover, Chambers was also
allowed to examine Turner, McDonald's alibi, whose testimony undermined McDonald's side of
the story.
226. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996).
227. Id. (emphasis added).
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This interpretation of Chambers is wholly unfounded and mis-
leading. In reality, the evidentiary rulings at play in Chambers were
not erroneous at all under Mississippi's rules of evidence. Mississippi
was one of many states which did not recognize a hearsay exception
for declarations against penal interest and which still recognized a
form of the common law "voucher" rule.228 The trial judge, nonethe-
less, applied the state's hearsay rules quite liberally by permitting
Chambers to present McDonald's signed confession to the jury.
229
Consequently, it is not at all clear what Justice Scalia meant by label-
ing the evidentiary rulings "erroneous." If he meant that the eviden-
tiary rulings were unconstitutional, then his interpretation of the
Chambers holding is that "[unconstitutional] evidentiary rulings can,
in combination, rise to the level of a due process violation"-a rather
unremarkable assertion.2
30
Several of the Court's decisions establishing the constitutional
right to defend would likely have been decided differently under the
Egelhoff analysis. For example, using historical practice as a "primary
guide,"'231 it is difficult to see how Mississippi's implementation of
traditional, common law evidentiary rules in Chambers can offend
some traditional, deeply rooted principle of justice. Similarly, the
state evidentiary exclusion in Green v. Georgia should not offend due
process inasmuch as the only evidentiary rule at play was the exclu-
sion of hearsay. 232 The defendant in Green was sentenced to death for
murder. 233 During the punishment phase of the trial, the court pre-
vented him from introducing a witness who would have testified that a
third party (who was already convicted in a separate trial for the same
murder) confessed to sending the defendant off on an errand and then
committing the murder himself.234 Instead of involving itself in an in-
depth historical analysis, the Court in Green held that, "[riegardless of
whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay rule,
under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a violation of the
228. See Clinton, supra note 219, at 786 n.358, 788.
229. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291.
230. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022. The plurality would have been more intellectually
honest to have simply overruled Chambers. One seemingly important factor which the plurality
failed to mention was the fact that Chambers was a black defendant arrested during the civil
rights movement in Mississippi. Accordingly, the Chambers Court probably evinced a height-
ened sensitivity to Chambers' due process arguments, notwithstanding the fact that the trial
court properly followed Mississippi's common law rules of evidence.
231. Id. at 2017.
232. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
233. See id. at 95.
234. See id. at 96.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 235 As was the
case in Chambers, the Court observed that the confession was against
interest and was made "spontaneously to a close friend" shortly after
the murders. 236 The testimony was, therefore, deemed sufficiently re-
liable and its exclusion from the jury was held unconstitutional. 237
Furthermore, using Justice Scalia's analysis outside the limited scope
of the "right to defend" cases, many significant contemporary due
process decisions would not pass muster.238
Justice Scalia is correct in his assertion that probative defense evi-
dence may be withheld from the jury when a defendant willfully vio-
lates a procedural rule.239 This type of evidentiary exclusion is clearly
distinguishable, however, from the evidentiary exclusion in Egelhoff.
For example, in Taylor v. Illinois, the Court held that
there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not iden-
tified until after the 11th hour has passed. If a pattern of discovery
violations is explicable only on the assumption that the violations
were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony, it
would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence re-
gardless of whether other sanctions would also be merited.
240
Reliability of witness testimony, therefore, is a major concern ad-
vanced by such a sanction. Montana, however, cannot justify its stat-
ute based on reliability concerns. 241 Moreover, it seems fair to
penalize a defendant for intentional misconduct. No comparable level
of culpability is necessarily required to trigger the operation of Mon-
tana's statute. Finally, and most importantly, sanctions for discovery
violations are neutral in their operation. That is, they can be brought
against the prosecution as well as the defense. Therefore, "when they
do help [the prosecution], [they] do so only incidentally." 242
235. Id. at 97.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (finding a constitutional right to
psychiatric testimony when sanity is at issue); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)
(finding a due process right to hearing and counsel preceding revocation of probation); Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (finding a due process right to protection from prejudi-
cial publicity); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (finding a constitutional right to
discovery of exculpatory evidence).
239. See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991).
240. 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988).
241. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (evidence of involuntary intoxication is
admissible).
242. Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2029 (1996) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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B. The Lack of a Constitutional Test
In describing the "right to defend" line of jurisprudence in 1976,
Professor Clinton observed that "the cases almost totally fail to pro-
vide any rationale or consistent test to be applied. '243 Unfortunately,
not much has changed over the past two decades.
1. The Court's current "test": historical practice plus contemporary
notions of "fundamental fairness"
Clearly, the principal bone of contention between the plurality
and dissent in Egelhoff involves the question of how much weight the
Court should place on historical practice in answering due process
questions. Justice Scalia sets the tone of the plurality opinion by de-
claring that historical practice is the "primary guide" for determining
whether a procedural rule violates due process.
244
In support of this statement, he cites Medina v. California.245 In
Medina, however, the Court relied on a two-prong test to reach its
conclusion, only the first prong of which related to historical criminal
practice. 246 Specifically, in upholding a statute which placed the bur-
den of proving incompetency to stand trial on the defendant, the
Court noted that the burden of proof in pretrial competency hearings
was historically placed on the defendant.247 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, explicitly stated that "[h]istorical practice is probative
of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental.
'248
The literal distinction, however, between the use of historical practice
as a "primary guide" and as "probative evidence" of a rule's funda-
mental nature is rather obvious. Furthermore, on the second prong,
the Medina Court addressed the question of whether the rule violated
any principle of "fundamental fairness" currently in operation.
249
Therefore, from both a textual and an operative point of view, the
plurality's reliance on Medina is somewhat misleading.
The Egelhoff plurality conceded that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to present a defense.250 It distinguished the "right
to defend" line of precedent, however, on the grounds that the states
243. Clinton, supra note 219, at 795.
244. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017.
245. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
246. See id. at 448.
247. See id. at 446.
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. See id. at 448.
250. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996).
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in those cases failed to come forward with a "valid" justification for
their evidentiary exclusions. 251 The Court will therefore give some
weight to non-historical concepts of fundamental fairness. The level
of scrutiny with which the Court views a state's professed justification
for its procedure, however, is extremely low. Based on Egelhoff, the
Court is willing to accept as "valid" a state's interest in keeping dan-
gerous people off the streets by lowering the burden on the prosecu-
tion. A state's "valid" interest in raising the state's conviction rate can
thereby trump a defendant's fundamental interest in introducing ex-
culpatory evidence related to his mental state.252 The unfortunate re-
sult is that more innocent defendants may be incarcerated.
Over the years, the Court has failed to establish any clear test for
dealing with criminal due process issues, opting instead to answer
criminal due process questions on a case-by-case basis. This is particu-
larly obvious in cases such as Egelhoff where historical criminal prac-
tice and modern notions of fundamental fairness come into conflict.
The Court's decision to deal with right to defend questions in this
manner is likely based, at least in part, on its fear that the open recog-
nition of a constitutional right to defend would open the floodgates of
litigation. As Professor Clinton suggests, however, "[t]he [case-by-
case] approach, insofar as it fails to yield any guiding principles, seem-
ingly encourages appeals seeking a sui generis ruling.
'253
2. The balancing test: a more "fundamentally fair" inquiry
There were hopeful signs in Ake v. Oklahoma254 that the Court
was moving towards a more structured, less deferential test. In Ake,
the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, held that the
Constitution requires that a state provide the assistance of a psychia-
trist to an indigent defendant when that assistance is necessary to his
defense. 25 5 In conspicuously broad language, Justice Marshall as-
serted that an indigent defendant must have "a fair opportunity to
present [a] defense. '256 In holding that Oklahoma deprived Ake of a
fair trial, Marshall applied a balancing test with three relevant factors:
(1) the private interest affected by the state action, (2) the state inter-
251. See id.
252. See infra Part IV.B.2.a. for an explanation of why a defendant has a fundamental inter-
est in the introduction of such evidence.
253. Clinton, supra note 219, at 797.
254. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
255. See id. at 83.
256. Id. at 76.
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est affected by the court's ruling, and (3) the probable value of alter-
nate procedural safeguards. 257
In applying the foregoing test to the case before it, the Court
stated that "[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a criminal pro-
ceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost
uniquely compelling. ' 258 On the second prong, the state's argument
that such a requirement would result in a staggering financial burden
on the state was summarily rejected.259 The Court noted that many
states, and the federal government, provided psychiatric assistance to
indigent defendants and they had not found that the burden was too
great.260 Moreover, "a State may not legitimately assert an interest in
maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of
that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict ob-
tained. '2 61 Finally, the Court opined that there were no reasonable
procedural alternatives inasmuch as "the assistance of a psychiatrist
may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his
defense." 262
Unfortunately, as described above, the Court abandoned this an-
alytical approach in Medina, with the majority once again asserting
that the ambiguous "fundamental principle" analysis was more appro-
priate for dealing with due process issues.2 63 Had the Court, in Egel-
hoff, decided to apply the Ake test, the inequity of Montana's
exclusionary statute would have been revealed. This is illustrated in
the following discussion.
a. The defendant's interest
Professor Susan Mandiberg clearly articulated why a defendant
has a fundamental interest in introducing evidence of intoxication on
the question of mens rea.2 64 Unless the defendant confesses to the
crime, mens rea can' never be proved by direct evidence.265 The pros-
257. See id. at 77.
258. Id. at 78.
259. See id. at 78-79.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 79. This statement, standing alone, would seem to condemn the Montana statute,
as the only comprehensible purpose of the statute is to endow the prosecution with a tactical
advantage over the defense.
262. Id. at 80.
263. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (rejecting the "balancing test" for
evaluating the validity of a state criminal procedural rule).
264. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The Constitutional Di-





ecution will only be able to submit circumstantial evidence from which
the defendant's mental state can be inferred.266 For example, if the
defendant, waiting at a red light, suddenly accelerated through the
light and killed the victim, most jurors would believe (absent any addi-
tional evidence) that the homicide was intentional. 267 In other words,
"[i]f the only context available is that presented by the prosecution's
evidence of the act and result, there will be no inclination to question
the conclusion that the defendant intended both. ' 268 The level of cul-
pability required for a conviction is thereby lowered from a subjective
to an objective (negligence) standard as the defendant's mental state
is judged based on purely external circumstances.
This concern was voiced by Justices Breyer and Stevens in dis-
sent. They argued that this consequence also casts doubt on Gins-
burg's conclusion that Montana simply rewrote its deliberate
homicide statute:
Why would a legislature want to write a statute that draws such a
distinction, upon which a sentence of life imprisonment, or death,
may turn? If the legislature wanted to equate voluntary intoxica-
tion, knowledge, and purpose, why would it not write a statute that
plainly says so, instead of doing so in a roundabout manner that
would affect, in dramatically different ways, those whose minds,
deeds, and consequences seem identical?
269
Accordingly, under the Ake framework it is clear that a defendant has
a fundamental interest in presenting evidence of his intoxication as it
pertains to his mental capacity.
b. The state's interest
The next question is: how important is the state's interest in plac-
ing a blanket exclusion on such evidence? Under contemporary due
process analysis, if the right to introduce exculpatory evidence per-
taining to mens rea is fundamental, then it cannot be abridged absent
a compelling state interest.
270
The link between alcohol and violent crime cannot be questioned.
It is estimated that alcohol is involved in over one half of all homi-
cides. 271 This statistical evidence, however, does not, by itself, warrant
266. See id. at 232.
267. This hypothetical illustration is borrowed from Justice Breyer's dissent in Montana v.
Egelhoff. See 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2035 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
268. Mandiberg, supra note 264, at 232.
269. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
270. See Mandiberg, supra note 264, at 236.
271. See HELEN ERSKINE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ALCOHOL AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 8 (1972) ("In a study of 588 homicides... in 64% of the
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the exclusion of intoxication evidence. In addition, there needs to be
some showing that such evidence is inherently unreliable or unduly
prejudicial. Moreover, if the state can achieve its goals by other
means without interfering with a defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense, such as a case-by-case evaluation, then such means
should be investigated.272 Accordingly, returning to Mandiberg's ana-
lytical framework, Montana has a legitimate interest in both reliable
fact-finding and in incapacitating dangerous offenders. 273
i. The state's interest in the reliability of evidence
Mandiberg believes that a state's professed concern for the relia-
bility of evidence of intoxication masks a deeper concern that allowing
juries to consider such evidence will result in the acquittal of more
violent inebriate offenders. 274 Moreover, she avers that the blanket
exclusion of such evidence presupposes that the risk of counterfeit ev-
idence of intoxication is greater than for other types of evidence or
that the consequences of failing to identify such fabricated evidence is
greater in cases of voluntary intoxication. 275
It is difficult to understand why the potential for fakery is any
greater here than in other cases where "mistake of fact" or "extreme
emotional disturbance" are involved. Professor Jerome Hall believes
that the opposite conclusion seems more likely inasmuch as "the his-
tory of the defendant and the events preceding his wrongful act are
examined in greater detail in the drunkenness cases than is usual. '276
Moreover, Hall continues, such "simulation" of an intoxicated condi-
tion "presupposes ... high intelligence, histrionic ability, and careful
calculation," traits generally not evinced by inebriate offenders. 277
It is also argued-and implied by the Egelhoff plurality-that
such evidence will cause undue prejudice or will confuse the jury.278 It
is difficult to understand, however, why the risk of jury confusion is
cases alcohol was a factor and in the majority of these alcohol was present in both offender and
victim."); Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1681-82 (1981) ("About
one-half of homicide perpetrators and victims are to some extent under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the incident.").
272. See Mandiberg, supra note 264, at 229-30.
273. See id. at 231.
274. See id. at 245.
275. See id. at 239.
276. Hall, supra note 186, at 1047-48.
277. Id. at 1048.
278. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996). Justice Scalia argued that the
rule prevents juries, who might otherwise be misled, from being "too quick to accept the claim
that the defendant was biologically incapable of forming the requisite mens rea." Id.
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greater here than in the numerous other situations in which juries are
expected to make factually complex decisions. In fact, most jurors will
have at least some understanding of the effects of alcohol on mental
competence. The risk of juror confusion, therefore, seems less likely
here than in cases where a defendant invokes the defense of insanity,
and the jury makes its determination based almost entirely on con-
flicting expert testimony.
Finally, evidence of involuntary intoxication may be considered
by Montana juries when evaluating a defendant's mental state.
279
Consequently, any claim by Montana that evidence of intoxication
will create jury confusion or prejudice is inconsistent with its own stat-
utory provision for involuntary intoxication. As Justice O'Connor ar-
gues: "That exception makes plain that Montana does not consider
intoxication evidence misleading-but rather considers it relevant-
for the determination of a person's capacity to form the requisite
mental state. ''280
ii.. The state's interests in deterring crime and incapacitating
dangerous offenders
The Egelhoff plurality recognized that Montana's statute pro-
motes general deterrence by "increasing the punishment for all unlaw-
ful acts committed in [an intoxicated] state."'281 Upon close
examination, however, the validity of this justification seems
untenable.
Those criminal defendants who lack the required culpability for
the offense because of extreme intoxication will not be deterred be-
cause, by definition, they acted without the required intent in the first
place. In other words, an unintentional act cannot be deterred. Per-
haps what the plurality meant is that the rule will deter those defen-
dants who get intoxicated for the purpose of committing a crime, and
then use their intoxication as a defense. Such cases are likely to be
infrequent because "a person who planned to commit a crime would
not wish to incapacitate himself by becoming grossly intoxicated (and
that is the degree relevant to the moot issues of penal responsibil-
ity)."' 282 In any event;i a defendant who forms the requisite intent
before he becomes intoxicated is guilty of the offense regardless of
279. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) (creating exception for defendants who were
involuntarily intoxicated).
280. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2020.
282. Hall, supra note 186, at 1048.
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how drunk he gets. 283 Moreover, allowing a defendant to use evi-
dence of intoxication as it affects his mental state does not mean that
he will be acquitted. He may still be guilty of any crime which re-
quires recklessness or, possibly, negligence. 284
Another significant problem with the Court's general deterrence
argument is that it ignores the significant number of inebriate offend-
ers who suffer from the disease of alcoholism and who, therefore, are
not capable of being deterred. As indicated above, there is unques-
tionably a link between alcohol consumption and violent crime.285
Consequently, one might logically infer a link between alcoholism and
crime. This hypothesis is supported by statistical evidence.2 86 In one
study of 223 consecutively admitted male criminals, 43% were diag-
nosed as alcoholic.2 87 Moreover, it is generally accepted by the medi-
cal community that alcoholism is a physical disease which renders the
alcoholic unable to control his ingestion of alcohol.288 Although no
specific biological cause has been isolated, the American Medical As-
sociation posits six metabolic theories of causation.
289
The foregoing casts some doubt on the assertion that all individu-
als who become intoxicated are in some way morally culpable or, as
Justice Scalia argues, that Montana's evidentiary "rule comports with
and implements society's moral perception that one who has volunta-
rily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the conse-
quences. '290 By contrast, Professor Steven Nemerson argues that
[v]irtually every drink taken by an alcoholic is "voluntarily" taken,
in the sense that it follows from a willed, muscular contrac-
tion .... But, for an act to be "voluntary," in the sense required for
moral fault, the actor must also have the substantial capacity to will
other than he does-he must be substantially capable of choosing
not to engage in that act .... [And] as we have seen, the alcoholic
lacks the substantial capacity to control his drinking.291
283. See, e.g., Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401, 416-17 (1870) ("[I]f the defendant had formed
the intent while in possession of his mental faculties, ... his subsequent voluntary intoxica-
tion ... would not shield him from a conviction ....").
284. See, e.g., State v. Shine, 479 A.2d 218, 223 (Conn. 1984).
285. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
286. See James J. Collins, Jr., Alcohol Careers and Criminal Careers, in DRINKING AND
CRIME: PERSPECIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMI-
NAL BEHAVIOR 152, 188-93 (James J. Collins, Jr. ed., 1981).
287. Robert A. Moore, Legal Responsibility and Chronic Alcoholism, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 748, 753 (1966).
288. See Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 393, 398-400 (1988).
289. See id. at 400-01.
290. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2020 (1996).
291. Nemerson, supra note 288, at 414.
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Accordingly, Montana's reliance on general deterrence principles in
support of its statute rests on numerous inaccurate assumptions and,
as such, is substantially unfounded.
The plurality also maintained that the Montana statute serves as a
specific deterrent by incapacitating those inebriate offenders who are
unable to control their violent impulses.292 Undoubtedly, Montana's
statute will have the effect of raising its conviction rate. This argu-
ment, however, can be made in support of virtually any exclusionary
rule which prevents a defendant from introducing exculpatory evi-
dence. Even Justice Scalia would have to admit that this "crime con-
trol" rationale, standing alone, cannot be "valid" enough to outweigh
a criminal defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence.
c. Alternate means for protecting states' interests
Another significant problem inherent in the Court's "valid justifi-
cation" test is that states are not compelled to look into less intrusive
means for accomplishing their goals; that is, means which would not
eviscerate a defendant's right to introduce probative, exculpatory evi-
dence. Professor Peter Westen believes that an "alternative means"
analysis should be constitutionally required:
The "alternative means" analysis ... prohibits the state from fur-
thering its interests by burdening constitutional rights where less
drastic alternatives adequately serve its interests. A less drastic al-
ternative is adequate by that analysis, even if less effective, if the
added effectiveness of the more drastic alternative is insufficient to
justify the latter's burden on constitutional rights.
293
Similarly, recall that the test applied by the Court in Ake, and subse-
quently abandoned in Medina, included an inquiry into the probable
value of alternate procedural safeguards.
294
With regard to evidence of voluntary intoxication, it is difficult to
understand why a blanket exclusionary rule is necessary. As
Mandiberg points out, although reliability concerns may demand total
exclusion of intoxication evidence in some cases,
there may be a number of occasions in which reliability can be
equally well assured by effective cross-examination, jury instruc-
tions and oral argument. In the latter situation, in fact, reliability
would be lessened by exclusion, because the jury would not hear
probative, relevant evidence on a major issue in the case. 295
292. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020.
293. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MicH. L. REv. 71, 149 (1974).
294. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
295. Mandiberg, supra note 264, at 244-45.
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The Montana statute effectively removes the question of reliability
from the discretion of the trial judge and is thereby over-inclusive,
precluding jury consideration of both reliable and unreliable evidence.
The evaluation of intoxication evidence on a case-by-case basis would
clearly be less intrusive to a defendant's right to present exculpatory
evidence.
C. Ginsburg's Concurrence, the Definition of Offenses, and the
Proportionality Doctrine
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the dissent that the Montana statute
was unconstitutional when viewed as an evidentiary prescription
designed to exclude relevant exculpatory evidence. 296 She took the
position, however, that the statute simply redefined the mens rea ele-
ment of deliberate homicide.
297
The eight other members of the Court disagreed with this inter-
pretation inasmuch as it was not shared by the Montana Supreme
Court.298 In response to this concern, Justice Ginsburg argued that
the Montana Supreme Court "simply did not undertake an analysis in
line with the principle that legislative enactments plainly capable of a
constitutional construction ordinarily should be given that construc-
tion. ' 299 Regardless of which interpretation is correct, one thing is
clear: the Court will uphold state statutes which redefine mens rea so
as to make voluntary intoxication irrelevant. Of the four dissenting
justices, only Justices Breyer and Stevens left open any possibility that
such a statute might be unconstitutional.
3°°
According to Justice Ginsburg, the new "statute" has the follow-
ing functional structure:
To obtain a conviction, the prosecution must prove only that
(1) the defendant caused the death of another with actual knowl-
edge or purpose, or
(2) that the defendant killed "under circumstances that would
otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's]
voluntary intoxication. '30
1
296. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
297. See id.
298. See, e.g., id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("We are, of course, bound to accept the
interpretation of [state] law by the highest court of the State." (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch.
Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) (alteration in original))).
299. Id. at 2025 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
300. See id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I would reserve the question of whether or not
such a hypothetical statute might exceed constitutional limits.").
301. Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for American Alliance for Rights
and Responsibilities et al. as Amici Curiae at 6) (alteration in original).
[Vol. 73:425
MONTANA V. EGELHOFF
Thus, to be convicted of murder, a sober defendant must have the
intent to kill or the knowledge that his actions will cause death. An
intoxicated defendant, however, may be convicted of murder for mere
negligent behavior, if his acts are sufficient to establish the knowledge
or purpose of a sober person in his position.
Two classes of defendants will thereby be convicted for murder
absent purpose or knowledge. The first class will be defendants who
are so intoxicated at the time of the killing that they are biologically
incapable of forming an intent to kill. Egelhoff arguably fell into this
category. The second class will be defendants who are sober enough
to have the ability to form the requisite intent but do not do so. In-
stead, their intoxicated state causes them to behave negligently.
Under the foregoing statute, however, when a death results from such
negligent behavior, the defendant will be convicted of murder if the
circumstances of the killing would have been sufficient to establish
intent in a sober person. Consequently, a defendant may be convicted
of murder and sentenced to death or life in prison for behaving negli-
gently. It is hard to believe that such a result is constitutional.
The only real limit to states' authority in this area is the Eighth
Amendment proportionality doctrine.30 2 The Eighth Amendment
provides that "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] in-
flicted. '30 3 In Weems v. United States,3°4 the Court interpreted "cruel
and unusual punishment" to include punishment which is dispropor-
tional to the crime committed.30 5 More recently, in a five to four
opinion authored by Justice Powell, the Court affirmed the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of a defendant's sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.3°6 The defendant was
sentenced pursuant to South Dakota's habitual offender law after be-
ing convicted for fraudulently passing off a check for which there was
no account.30 7 He had been convicted on six previous occasions, in-
cluding three convictions for burglary and one for driving while intoxi-
cated.308 The Court deemed the defendant's sentence uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate punishment. 30 9 While Justice Powell
agreed that courts should generally grant state legislatures considera-
302. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
303. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
304. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
305. See id. at 366-67.
306. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 283-84 (1983).
307. See id. at 281.
308. See id. at 279-80.
309. See id. at 303.
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ble deference in establishing punishments for crimes, he maintained
that "no penalty is per se constitutional. '310
In Harmelin v. Michigan,31' Harmelin was convicted of possessing
672 grams of cocaine and, although it was his first conviction, received
a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 312 In a five to four decision, in a part of the opinion written by
Justice Scalia and joined only by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held
that this sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 313 Justice
Scalia asserted that "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportion-
ality guarantee," and would have overruled the entire line of jurispru-
dence. 314 Three Justices-Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter-agreed
that Harmelin's punishment was not disproportionate, but maintained
that the proportionality doctrine was still good law.315 Justices White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.31 6
Although the Supreme Court has been less receptive to Eighth
Amendment arguments in recent years, the Amendment has never
been applied to a statute which prescribes death or life imprisonment
for negligent behavior. Given the Court's resolve to address criminal
due process questions on a case-by-case basis, it seems possible, given
the right factual scenario, to attack the Montana statute on propor-
tionality grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
Blanket exclusionary rules which preclude jury consideration of
reliable, exculpatory evidence should be deemed unconstitutional ab-
sent a compelling state justification. The state's interest in improving
its conviction rate cannot be considered compelling if "due process of
law" is to remain synonymous with "fundamental fairness." Such ex-
clusionary rules distort the adversarial process by lowering the prose-
cution's burden at trial, and thereby only serve to increase the state's
conviction rate.
A fairer method for conducting due process analyses was imple-
mented by the Court in Ake v. Oklahoma,317 only to be abandoned
310. Id. at 290.
311. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
312. See id. at 994.
313. See id.
314. Id. at 965.
315. See id. at 1008-09.
316. Id. at 1009, 1027. Significantly, three of the four dissenters in Harmelin-White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun-have retired from the Court.
317. See 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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seven years later in Medina v. California.318 Under the Ake test, a
defendant's interest in introducing exculpatory evidence is weighed
against both the state's professed interest in using its exclusionary rule
and the probable value of alternate procedural safeguards.
Using the Ake formulation, it becomes clear that a criminal de-
fendant has a fundamental interest in introducing reliable, exculpatory
evidence. A defendant's right to a fair trial is implicated in particular
in cases such as Montana v. Egelhoff,319 where the evidence in ques-
tion is probative of his mental state. Specifically, a defendant's intoxi-
cated state may be his only explanation for why he acted in an
unreasonable manner and may be his only hope of rebutting the cir-
cumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution. If the defendant
is precluded from introducing such evidence, the level of culpability
required for conviction is effectively lowered from a subjective to an
objective, "reasonable person" standard. This should be unacceptable
in a society which places substantial weight on the distinction between
intentional and negligent conduct. In other words, Egelhoff was
wrongly decided.
318. See 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
319. 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
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